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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
ANIMALS-KNOWLEDGI': OF VICIOUS PROPSNSITY-0WN$ NOT LIAllLS FOR

Doc UPS:i::T'l'ING FoRD.-The defendant's dog hacil been in the habit of following and barking at automobiles, and this fact was known to the defendant.
The plaintiff was riding with her husband in a Ford c.-ar, when suddenly the
defendant's dog jumped in front of them. By running over the dog, the
car was thrown against an embankment and the plaintiff was injured. Held,
that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, there being no evidence of a
vicious propensity in the dog. Melicker v. Sedlacek (Iowa, 1920), 179 N.
w. 197.
:
In general, the owner is not liable for injury inflicted by his domestic
animal unless he can be charged with knowledge of a vicious propensity
which contributed to the injury. Masoti v. Keeling, I Ld. Raym. 6o6;
Fritsche v. Clemow, 109 Ill. Ap. "335· A dog will not make its master liable
by knocking a person down, where it is not shoWib that the dog had a propensity for so doing. Forsythe v. Kluckhohn, 150 Iowa, 126. · Likewise, the
owner of a turkey is not liable for its frightening a horse. Zumstein v.
Schnm1m, 22 Ont. App. Rep. 263. Nor is the owner liable for his dog jumping over a fence and landing on the neck of the plaintiff, for the same reason. Sanders v. Teape, 51 L. T. N. S. 263. Neither is there any liaoility
resulting from a chicken flying into' the spokes of a bicycle and upsetting
the rider. Hadwell v. Righton [1907], 2 K. B. 345. Nor from a sow frightening a horse so that the driver of an automobile coming from the opposite
direction had to drive into a stone wall in order to avoid hitting the hors.e.
Higgins v. Searle, 25 T. L. R. 301. Undoubtedly, the principal case· was correctly decided, for there was no evidence that the defendant's dog liad a
vicious propensity for jumping under Fords and causing them to leave th~
road, to the discomfort of their occupants.

LARG~Y Exca»mG CosT
COMMJ?RCE.-An oil inspection statute in the· state
of Georgia was attacked on the ground that for a number 9f years the
amount of the fees fixed by the law had proved to be largely in excess of
the actual cost of the inspection. Held, that the statute was unconstitutional
and void as to interstate commerce. Te:ras Co. v. Brown (D. C., N. D.,
Georgia, 1920). 266 Fed. 577.
·
In the exercise of its police power a state may enact inspection laws
which are valid if they tend in a direct and substantial manner to promote
the public safety and welfare, or to protect the public from fraud and imposition whr.n dealinp: in articles of general use, as to .which Congress has not
made any conflicting regulation, and a fee reasonably sufficient to pay the
cost of such inspection may constitutionally be charged, even though the
CoMMJ>RC:£-0IL

lNSPSCTION LAw WITH FEES

INVALID AS TO lN'l'$S'l'ATI':
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property may be moving in interstate commerce when inspected. P11re Oil
Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U. S. 158; Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina·
Board of Agriculture, 191 U. S. 345; McLean & Co. v. Rio Grande R. R.
Co., 203 U.S. 38; Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251. But when such inspection
charge is obviously and largely in excess· of the cost of inspection the act
will be declared void as constituting in its operation an obstruction to and
a burden upon that commerce among the states, the exclusive regulation of
which is committed to Congress by the Constitution. Foote & Co. v. Maryland, 232 U. S. 494; Pure Oil Co. v. Minn., supra. The court in passing
upon a law of this sort is confronted with the difficulty of determining
whether the measure in question is a bona fide inspection law or a veiled
revenue measure. Obviously, laws of the latter type may be divided into
two classes. In the one are those laws whose invalidity necessarily appears
at first glance, as where it is provided that a certain percentage of the proceeds is to be turned over to the state treasurer as part of the general fund,
or that the expense incurred in carrying out the provisions of the act is to
be paid out of a limited portion of the total receipts only and no further
provision is made from the general fund. See Caldwell v. State, 119 N. E.
999; and Wofford Oil Co. v. Smith, 263 Fed. 396. This situation presents
no difficulty and the court can say immediately that the act is unconstitutional and enjoin its execution. Where, as in the principal case, however,
the law is valid upon its face, subject only to the objection that the amount
to be collected will prove excessive, the situation is somewhat different. It
seems to be well settled that the court will not declare a statute of this type
invalid in the first instance, since to do so would be to hold the legislature
guilty of bad faith, and the presumption is that if the fees prove excessive
in practice the legislature will reduce them. Red "C" Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board
of Agriculture, 222 U. S. 393. When the facts clearly show, however, that
the e;x:cessive charge has been continued over a period of years, the court
is forced to conclude that the act was intended as a revenue measure, under
the guise of an inspection law, and to declare it void accordingly. Foote &
Co. v. Maryla1f-d, supra; Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U. S. 389; Castle
v. Mason, 91 Ohio St. 266. A more striking situation results when the act
also provides for non-inspection· duties and evidently contemplates that the
added expense will be borne by inspection fees. Upon its face a law of
this sort is within the first class, but at least in cases where there is a provision for appropriation from the general fund, in case the amount derived
from the fees proves insufficient for the total expense, the court will place
it in the second class and refuse to declare it void in the first instance, on
the ground that inasmuch as there is a possibility that experience may show
that the proceeds are insufficient for both purposes, and since the presumption is that the fees will be used lawfully if it is in any way possible, the act
may prove valid in practice. Foote & Co. v. Maryland, supra; American
C9al,Mining Co. v. The Special Coal and Food Comtnission of Indiana el al.
(D. C., Dist. of Indiana, Sept. 6, 1920), - Fed.-.
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CoK:W::ERcr:-RouNDHOUSI; LABoRn lNJU~D WHII.'S DUMPING ASHl;S llROM
ENGINJ; Hi>LD NO'l' ENGAGJ;D IN INT:ERSTA'l'S Crou.1~-Plaintiff was a laborer
in a roundhouse. He was injured while removing ashes from an engine
which had recently come in carrying interstate freight. Tlie next trip of
the engine was not known, as it hauled both interstate and intrastate trains
and was not under orders. In an action under the Workmen's Compensation Law for injuries, the defendant contended that the plaintiff was engaged
in interstate commerce. Held, the plaintiff was not engaged in interstate
commerce. Boals v. Pe1insylvania R. Co. (1920), 183 N. Y. Sup. 915.
The test as to whether one is engaged in interstate commerce seems to
be: was the employee at the time of the in1ury directly engaged in interstate
transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a pa.rt
of it? Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Hansford, 173 Ky. 126. When the work is
done directly on the tracks, bridges, or roadbed of an interstate railroad, it
is uniformly held that the employee is engaged in interstate transportation,
and the situation is not altered by its use as an intrastate railroad at the
same time. Pederson v. Delaware, etc.. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146. .Where the
work done is on· an engine, car, or other rolling stock, an employee is not
engaged inc interstate commerce unless the instrument under repair is designated positively for use in interstate commerce. Narey v. Minneapolis, etc.,
R. Co., 177 Ia. 6o6. Its character as an instrument of commerce depends
upon its employment at the time, not upon remote probabilities or upon
accidental later events. Ma~•er v. Union R. Co., 256 Pa. St. 474 When the
workman is not directly engaged on ·an instrument of interstate commerce,
but his work is more remotely connected with it, the problem becomes m'>re
difficult. Such work as is so closely reiated to interstate commerce as to be
in practice and legal contemplation a part of it is interstate transportation.
A guard at a l:ailroad crossing, a workman leaving his work on an interstate railroad, a brakeman on an intrastate car disconnecting an interst:l.te
car from it, have all been- held to be engaged in interstate transportation.
Pederson v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 229 U. S. 146; Erie RailrC'ad Co. v. fVir.field, 244 U. $. 170; New York Central, etc., R. Co. v. Carr, 238 U. S. 200.
A workman on a railroad which has not yet become an instrumentality of
commerce, an employee tearing down a roundhouse rendered useless by
fire, a person taking down fixtures in an interstate roundhouse, have been
held not to be enga~ed in interstate transportation. Jackson v. Chicago, etc.,
Ry. Co., 210 Fed. 234; Thomas v. Boston & M. R., 218 Fed. 143; Sl;anks v.
Delawarr, 11/c., R Co., 23.9 U. S. ~!'6. See Ann. Cases, 1918B, 52.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Dtr.llGATJON oF LtGrsLA'l'l~'E PowllR.-A statute
empowered the state fire marshal, and other named officers, whenever they
should find any building or other structure which, for want of repair, or by
reason of age or dilapidated condition, or for any cause, was especially
liable to fire, and which was so situated as to endanger other property or
persons, to order the same remedied or removed at once. It also provided
that a property owner, who felt he was aggrieved by the order, could appeal
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to 1he state fire marshal, who would investigate the matter, but unless he
revoked the order it should be complied with. Failure to comply with the
order was made punishable by a fine; such penalty to be sued for in a justice of peace court or a court of record, with right of appeal. Held, the
statute is unc·onstitutional as being a delegation of legislative power to the
state fire marshal. People e:& rel. Gamber v. Sholcm (Ill., 1920), 128 N.
E. 377.
The majority of the court rest their decision on the ground that the
statute lays down no rule by which the fire marshal is to determine when a
building is especially liable to fire. \Vpat is "proper repair," what shall constitute "age and dilapidated condition," are wholly within the discretion of
the fire marshal. He is given arbitrary power to determine these matters
Wi!hout rule er limitation by which such determination shall be reached,
except that such building shall be especiaily liable to fire. As the decision
of the fire marshal is final, the property rights of the individual citizens may
be taken away without just compensation or due process of law, as required
bY. the constitution. Three judges dissented on the ground that the statute
did not confer upon the fire marshal arbitrary authority to determine when
a building was especially liable to fire. They hold that the provision· in the
statntt which requires that the penalty can be enforced only by a suit before
a justice of the peace or in a court of record gives the property owner the
right to appear and contest the decision of the fire marshal. It would seem
that the decision of the case must be determined by the construction of this
part of the statute. If, under the statute, an aggrieved property owner
cannot, whell' sued for the penalty, contest the decision of the fire marshal,
then the decision of the majority is correct. However, it seems to the writer
that the minority view is better, and that, in a suit for the penalty, the
property owner can contest the fire marshal's decision. Unless he has this
right, the suit in such court can have no real value. The statute gave the
right of appeal from the judgment of the trial court. That right can mean
nothing if the only proceeding in ·!he trial court is the formal entering of
judgment against the property owner for the amount of the penalty. It is
not unreasonable to suppose that the legislature intended that a property
owner should, in a suit for the penalty, have the right to contest the decision
of the fire marshal. and it is 1he duty of courts, in passing on the co:r.stitutionality of a statute, to give it such construction as wiII sustain it rather
than qnc which will destroy it. It is difficult to define the line which separates legislative power to make laws from administrative power to make
regulations. It seems obvious that the legislature could not define in detail
the exact conditions, which un<ler the different circumstances of location,
construction, condition, use, and for lack of repair, or by reason of age or
dilapidated condition. All the legislature can do is to define them in. general terms, and leave the determination of the fact to some administrative
official. In U11io1i Bridge Co. v. U. S., 204 U. S. 364, the constitutionality
of an Act of Congress was upheld, which declared that navigation should
be freed from unreasonable obstructions arising from bridges of insufficient
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height, width and span, or other defects, and which, after declaring this
general rule, imposed upon the Secretary of War the duty of ascertaining
what particular cases came within the rule prescribed by Congress, as well
as the duty of enforcing the rule. To deny to Congress the authority to
delegate to the executive branch of government the exercise in specific
instances of a discretionary power, which from the nature of 1:hc case Congress could not itself exercise, would be, the courts say, "to stop the wheels
of conduct of public business." In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, n8 U. S. 356, an
ordinance forbade any person to carry on a laundry within the city without
the consent of the board of supervisors, except in buildings of brick or
stone. Plaintiff, a native of China, who had complied with all the existing
regulations for the prevention of fire, was refused such consent by the
board, upon his application. The ordinance was held unconstitutional, as it
conferred upon the board arbitrary power, at its own will, to give or withhold consent as to persons or places, without regard to the competency of
the persons applying or ·the propriety of the place selected for carrying on
the business. This case, however, is distinguishable from the principal case.
In Yick W o v. H opkfos, supra, there was an arbitrary power in the board
to grant or refuse consent, and not a conferring of a discretion to be exercised upon a consideration of the circumstances of each case. In the principal case, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of legislative action,
had been determined by the legislature. · What was left to the fire marshal
was not the determination of what public policy demanded, but simply the
ascertainment of what the facts in each case required to be done, according
to the terms of the law. In England Parliament may confer upon administrative boards the power to arbitrarily decide, without }\indrance from the
courts, what method of application· an Act of Parliament is to have. Local
Govt Board v. Arlidge [I9I5], A. C. 120. See also the article in 32 HARV.
L. Rtv. 447.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MAKING STAT£ MtDICAI. ASSOCIATION THg STATE
BoARD oF HJ>AI.TH, WITHIN TH£ Pown oF TH~ L~ISLATUm;.-An act of the
Alabama legislature making the State Medical Association the State Board
of Health was attacked upon the ground that it was beyond the power of
the legislature to confer the authority given upon a purely private corporation. Held, that the act was valid. Parke v. Bradle)• ·(Ala., 1920), 86 So. 28.
The court otook the view that by virtue of the act the admittedly private
association became a public board, and that the powers delegated were conferred upon the latter organization, and not upon the Medical Association
as such. There was no dispute as to the power of the legislature to pass
health measures and to create a board with administrative functions to car1y
out its regulations. The position of the court therefore seems conclusive
as to the principal objection made to the act. A further objection was
raised, however, conceding this view of the effect of the act was correct,
that the members of the board· so designated: were in effect necessarily
selected by members of the State Medical Association acting in their private
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capacities, governed only by the rules of the association, and responsible
neither to the state nor to the people. This raises what seems to be the
real question involved in the case, namely. whether or not a legislature can
delegate to a private corporation or association the power to appoint members of a public board where the members of the private organization possess some special skill and training which peculiarly fits them to select
proper incumbmts for the offices. In the principal case this question is indirectly presented, and the court is able to make the somewhat metaphysical
counter that the individuals so selected become members of the association
only, and that their subsequent transition to the public board results not
from the election but from the designation of the association as the state
board. The ccurt is not content to rest upon this somewhat dubious ground,
however, but proceeds to review the authorities which have considered the
proposition directly and have held that such a delegation of the power to
appoint is valid. The following cases have held acts valid providing for the
appointment of medical examiners or members of state boards of health
by private corporations or associations: Scholle v. State, 9Cl Md. 729; E:r
parte Gerina, 143 Cal. 412; Brooks v. State, 88 Ala. 122; Ex parte Frazer, 54
Cal. 94- Acts delegating the appoin,!ment of state dental examiners to dental
associations have also been su:;tained. Wilkins v. State, n3 Ind. 514; Over.~hillcr v. State, 156 Ind. 187. In Bullock v. Billheimer, 175 Ind. 428, it was
held that the appointment of members of the advisory committee of the
, agricultural station could be delegated to various incorporated agricultural
societies. In Ex parte McManus, 151 Cal. 331, an act of the legislature pro\vided for a state board bf architecture, the members of which were to be
chosen by the governor from two associations of architects. There the
question of the validity of a delegation of the appointive power was involved
only indirectly. Nevertheless, the court upheld the general principle that
this power may be giveD to private institutions. In the ordinary state constitution there is no direct inhibition against such legislative action. Frequent objections to such legislation have been that it confers special privileges upon a limited class, and that in the case of corporations it confers
corporate powers by special act, contrary to the usual constitutional pro. vision prohibiting this. It has been held not to be a special privilege within.
the constitutional restriction because it is not exercised for the benefit of
the particular indiyiduals but for the general public. E:r: parte Gerina, ."1lPra; _
Ex parte Frazer, supra. It has als9 been held not to be a corporate power.
Ex parte_ Gerina, supra; Ex parte Frazer, supra; Overshiner v. State, supra.
In almost all of the cases involving the point courts have stressed the practical value of having the members of such boards selected by skilled bodies
haying a per,uliar interest in the successful administration of the Jaw. This
consideration seems to provide an adequate safeguard for a practice which
might easily become somewhat dangerous. Judging from the comparatively
few cases the practice of delegating ~uch appointive power is still in its
early stages of development, but it is worthy of note that in most of the
cases cited the institutions attacked had long been in existence. In the prin-
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cipal case the association had acted as the state board· of health in accordance
with the act for forty-five years without question.
CoNTRACTs-CoMMUNICA'l'ION oF OFI!"SR-MIS'l'AKE IN TuLF.GRAM.-Butler
wired an offer to buy 50 shares of stock, the telegram concluding, "Wire
confirmation." Foley wired acceptance as to 44 shares. Butler wired confirmation of the 44- Foley, defendant, failed to deliver. He based his
defe11se on the fact that the telegraph company left the word "subject" out
of his telegram by mistake, and that, since Butler asked for an answer by
wire, he made the telegraph company his agent and took the risk of mistake.
Held, Foley's counter proposition was an offer, of which Butler's second
message was an acceptance, and as the offerer makes the telegraph company
his agent, Foley took the risk of mistake and is responsible on the contract.
Butler v. Foley (Mich., I!)20), I79 N. W. 34.
Ayer v. Western Un.ion Tel. Co., 79 Me. 493; Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Shatter, 7I Ga. 76o, and Sherrerd v. Western Union Telegraph Co., I46 Wis.
I97, are strong authorities for the doctrine that if the -offerer communicates
his offer by telegram he makes the .telegraph company his agent, and is
bound by the offeree's acceptance of the offer as delivered, providing -the
offeree h3d no reascnable grounds for knowing there was a mistake. An
extreme application of the doctrine is seen in Price Brokerage Co. v. C., B.
& Q. R.R. Co. (Mo., I9I7), I99 S. W. 732, where the mistake changed the
the price of potatoes from $I.~5 to .35 per cwt., there being no potatoes on
the market at anything like the latter figure, yet the court held the sender
of the telegram bound by the contract. See, however, Germain Fruit Co. v.
Western Union Tel. Co., I37 Cal. 5g8. In Durkee v. Vermont Central R.R.
Co., 29 Vt. I27, and Magi.- v. Herman, 50 Minn. 424. both cited and relied
upon in the principal case, the question being which copy of the message
was primary evidence, it is said' that the one who first uses the wire in a
transaction makes the telegraph company his agent. But the principal case
must stand on the narrower ground that the offerer makes the telegraph
company his agent, irrespective of previous messages. The strongest argument for the above doctrine is to be found in the matter of commercial convenience. The cases opposed, which are at least as numerous and' are
stronger in technical legal reasoning, deny that the telegraph company is the
agent of the offerer with power to make a different contract from that which
he intended. If agent at all, it is only a special agent with specific authority
to deliver that particular message and no other. These cases give the sender
an action in contract or tort against the telegraph company, and if he is
injured by the mistake, the sendee also has an action in tort against the
company, but the sender is not bound by the sendee's acceptance of the
C'hanged offer. H en!ul v. Pape> L. R. 6 Exch. 7; Strong v. W ester11 Unioii Tel.
Co., I8 Tclaho 389, 409; Shingleur v. Western Union Tel. Co., 72 Miss. Io30;
Pepper v. Western Union Tel. Co., 87 Tenn. 554; Postal Tel. & Cable Co.
v. Schaefer, no Ky. 907; Mount Gilead Cotton Oil Co. v. Western Union
Tel. Co., I7I N. C. 705. See also I MI~. L. R.iw. 588. Undoubtedly, the
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principal case is correct in result, but not on the basis of agency. In contracts there is no offer until it enters the consciousness of the offeree, and
the offer is that which reaches his consciousness, if he interprets reasonably
and in good faith. Here the erroneous telegram reached the consciousness
of the offeree, and was therefore the offer, he having no reason to doubt
the correctness thereof.
CoRPORATIONS-AUT'.HORITY TO GUARANTEE CoNTRACT OF ANOTHER TO
WHOM CORPORATION WAS SELLING GOODS IS IMPLIED.-A moving picture producing company contracted with D Company for costumes, also with P for
lumber, •o use in the production of a film. Upon P refusing further credit,
D Company guaranteed payment of all bills P had or would have against
the producing company. In a suit on the guaranty, held, contract of guaranty is within the implied' powers ·of the company and is not ultra vires.
Wood's Lumber Co. v. Moore (Cal., 1920), 191 Pac. 905,
A corporation has implied power to make all contracts which are essential to the successful prosecution of the business. Bates v. Coronado B. Co.,
109 Cal. 100; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kiser, 91 Ga. 636. Or such contracts
as are necessary and helpful to the conduct of its authorized business. Timm
v. Grand Rapids Br. Co., 16o· Mich. 371; Depot Realty Syndicate v. En-terprise Br. Co., 87 Ore. 560. Or which tend directly to promote the business
authorized by its articles. Kraft v. BreaJing Co., 219 Ill. 205; Horst v. Lewis,
71 Neb. 365. If within the above principles, such a contract or guaranty or
suretyship is not ultra vires. Marbury v. Ke11tucky Union Lond Co., 62 Fed.
Rep. 335; Wheeler v. Everett Land Co., 14 Wash. 630; Winterfield v. Cream
City Br. Co., 96 Wis. 239- For other cases see note, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 186.
Whether a corporation's contract of guaranty is valid or ultra ·vires depends
then on whether it directly furthers the authorized business or is too remotely
in promotion of that business. In the following situations, as being a direct
benefit, the guaranty was held valid: Loan and Trust Co. guaranteeing bonds
of another corporation, upon sale thereof, Broadway Natl. Bank v. Baker,
176 Mass. 294; railroad company receiving bonds in payment of debt, sold
them with guaranty, Rogers Works v. Southern Ry. Assn., 34 Fed Rep. 278;
sawmill company guaranteeing bonds of railroad company for construction
of railroad to timber lands of sawmill company, -~fercantile Trust Co. v.
Kiser, 91 Ga. 636; land company, with authority to acquire right of way to
mines, guaranteeing bonds of railroad running co mines in order to secure
its construction, .Marbury v. Kentucky Union Land Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 335;
banking company guaranteeing bonds of railroad in which it owns a controlling interest, C"nlrai Railroad Co. v. Fanpers' L. & T. Co., n4 Fed. Rep.
263; lumber company going surety on bond of contractor to whom it furnishes supplies, Central Lumber Co•. v. Kelter, 201 Ill. 503; W"lieeler v. Everett
Land Co., 14 Wash. 630; brewing company going surety on license bond of
customer, Horst v. Lewis, 71 Neb. 365; Timm v. Grand Rapids Br. Co., 16o
Mich. 371; brewing company guaranteeing rent of customer, Halloran v.
Jacob Smidt Br. Co., 137 Minn. 141; Depot Realty Sy11dicate v. Enterprise
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Br. Co., 87 Ore. 56o; brewing company guaranteeing rent of hotel in which
its beer was to be sold, Winterfield v. Cream City Br. Co., g6 Wis. 239;
Holm v. Claus Lipsius Br. Co., 21 N. Y. App. Div. 204; brewing company
guaranteeing purchase price of saloon- in consideration of purchaser selling
its beer, Hagerstowii Br. Co. v. Gates, n7 Md. 348; a corporation going
surety on the obligation of another in order to procure payment of a debt
due it, In re West of E11gland Ba1ik, 14 Ch. Div. 317; Hzss v. W. & I.
Sloane, 66 N. Y. App. Div. 522; cattle company executing a guaranty to
protect itself from probable loss of debt due to it, N. Texas State Ba11k v.
Crowley-Southerland Com. Co. (Tex.), 145 S. W. 1027; same situation as
in principal case. But the benefit was considered too remote for the guaranty to be within the implied powers of the corporation in the following
situations: Bank guaranteeing paper of third party for which it received
no benefit, Bomen v. Needles Natl. Bank, 94 Fed. Rep.. 925; brewing c6mpany
signing appeal bond for customer, Best Br. Ca. v. Klassen, 185 Ill. 37; railroad guaranteeing dividends upon stock in steamship company which ran
to and from terminal of railroad, Colman v. Eastern Counties Railroad Co.,
IO Beav. l; upon stock in grain elevator company, M emph"is Grain & Elevator Co. v. Memphis Railroad Co., 85 Tenn. 703; upon stock in hotel company, West Maryland R. Co. v. Blue Ridge Hotel Co., 102 Md. 307; land
company guaranteeing dividends upon stock in investment company, Greene
v. Middleborough To~ Co., 121 Ky. 335; railroad company guaranteeing
payment of expenses of a large musical festival fu the city where it does
business, Davis v. Old. Colony R. Co., 131 Mass. 258. It appears that the
courts are becoming more lenient, allowing guaranty contracts by a corporation. If the contract has been performed in good faith and the corporation
has had the full benefit of performance, it should not be permitted to rely
on ultra vires as a defense.
CovtNANTS-TuNANT HEI.D ENTlTLl':D TO ENFOR<$ Cov!lNANT IN·Ll':ASF. BY
ANOTHER TeNANT.-A landlord leased certain parts of a building to one
tenant, giving him the right to sell dry goods. He leased another part of
the building to another tenant with the restriction that he should sell only
women's gloves, corsets·and hosiery. Upon. a violation of the covenant by
the second lessee, it was held that the first lessee was entitled to an injunction against him. (N. Y. 1920) Staff v. Bemis Realty Co. et al., 183 N. Y.
S. 886, III Misc. Rep. 635.
The point of interest in this case is that the court, passing by the que~
tion whether the recording of the plaintiff's lease was not constructive notice
<to the world of his peculiar rights· and the resultant restriction upon others,
held that the plaintiff's equity against the defendant was even stronger than
if the defendant had! had actual notice of the prior lease, because the defendant expressly covenanted to limit his use of the premises. A party's right
to avail himself of an equitable servitude in his favor has its basis in the
fact that he has a superior equity to that of the defendant, or else that the
defendant has no equity at all. Upon principle, it would seem that the
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defendant in the instant case had actual notice that somebody else had rights
in the premises with which he could not interfere. He had actual notice
that if he used the premises for any other purpose than that expressed in
his lease he would be violating his covenant. What difference could it make
to him who enforced the covenant against him? In the case of a building
scheme, for example, any grantee may enforce an equitable restriction against
any other grantee. Bouvier v. Segardi. (N. Y., 1920), 183 N. Y. S. 814;
Simpson v. Mikkelsen, 1g6 111. 575 (19o2); Allen v. Detroit, 167 Mich. 464
(1911); Kom v. Campbell, 192 N. Y. 490 (1go8). These authorities show
·conclusively that restrictions may be implied, and that a party does not have
to know who may enforce the covenant against him. The situation in the
principal case is closely analogous to the building scheme. The defendant
must have suspected that the entire premises belonging to the landlord were
being leased under certain restrictions. Indeed, that is usually the situation
when sucl,i a restriction is put into the grantee's lease. It could make no
difference to the defendant who could require him to live up to his agreement. He had actual notice of the limits of his rights in regard to the
premises. Therefore, he has no right to complain that the plaintiff is compelling him to refrain from doing what he has already agreed not to do.

•

CRIHINAL LAw-MoroR VEHICLE LAW WHICH MADE Qur.sTro~ ol" UNR£AsoNABLS SPEED ONE FOB. THE JURY, NOT Vom FOR UNCER'l'AIN'l'Y.-The petitioner was charged with driving his automobile within the city of Pasadeiia
at a rate of speed in violation of the motor vehicle law, which declared the
operation of a motor car at an unreasonable speed a crime, and left the
question of unreasonable for the jury. In an action questioning the validity
of the statute, held, not invalid for indefiniteness. Ex parte Daniels (Cal.,
1920), 192 Pac. 442.
In Ex parte Jackson, 45 Ark. 158, it was held that a statute making it a
misdemeanor to commit any act injurious to public health or public morals
was void for uncertainty. A statute making it a crime to charge or collect
more than a reasonable rate of toll was also void. Laws which define crime
ought to be so explicit that all men subject to their penalties may know
what acts it is their duty to avoid. Before a man can be punished, his case
must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute. United States v.
Brewer, 139 U. S. 280. In James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 144. the Supreme
Court said: "It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set
a net large enough to catch all possible offenders,· and leave it to the courts
to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained and who should be
set at large." In Hayes v. State, 11 Ga. App. 3791 the court held that a
statute making penal the operation of an automobile at a rate of speed
greatt'r than is reasonable and proper was void on the gr~und that it furnishet such a net as stated above. The Supreme Court of the United States
invoked the "rule of reason" when °it held that the Anti-Trust Act was not
a denial of all restraint of trade, but only a denial of unreasonable restr:.iint
of trade. Standard Oil Case, 221 U. S. I; Tobacco Trust C'!se, 221 U. S. 107.
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The Ohio court pointed out that it would be impossible to set a rate of speed
that would be· suitable under ·au conditions, and invoked "the rule of reason"
in holding valid a statute similar to the one in the principal case. State v.
Shaefer, II7 N. E. 220. The Nebraska Court in Schult:; v. State, 89 Neb. 34>
upheld a similar statute. The Texas Court in Sola1i & Billings v. Pasche,
153 S. W. 672, sa_id by way of dictum that a statute such as was upheld iµ
the principal case was void for indefiniteness, but held that it was sufficiently
definite as a remedial statute imposing a civil duty so as to render its vio- ·
lation negligence per se. A statute forbidding the driving of automobiles
in access of a certain speed "in the business portion" of cities was not void
for indefiniteness. People v. Dow, 155 Mich. us. See also 18 MICH. L. fuv.
810, and L R A. 1918 D, 132.
DEAD BoDn::s-PRormt'tY IN A CoRPss.-The plaintiff's mother was interred
in a burying ground which had been dedicated to that purpose by the original
owner. Defendant, without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, acting
tlirough its employees, disinterred the body, and1 reinterred it at a place
unknown to the plaintiff. A statute provides that wherever trespass will lie
an action on the case may be maintained. Held, that trespass would lie for
such rlisint,.rment, and that title and possession of the burial lot are not necessarily involved in the right sought to be protected. England v. Central
Pocahontas Coal Co. (W. Va., 1920), 104 S. E. 46.
Although the reasoning of the court is not altogether clear, it would
seem that it considers the corpse as the property of the plaintiff, for, in
holding that trespass would lie, it states specifically that title and possession
of the lot are immaterial. This case goes much forth.er than the great
majority of decisions on this subject, for in most of the decided cases the
courts have refused to recognize the right of property in a corpse. In fact,
the American courts have been almost unanimous in holding that the right
in a corpse is in the nature of a "quasi property" right, and nothing more.
See Keyes v. Konkel, n9 Mich. 550, and cases there cited. The general view
seems to be that to entitle one to an action of trespass he must have actual
or constructive possession of the soil where the body is interred. Bessemer
Land & Improvemmt Co. v. Jenkins, III Ala. 135; Meagher v. Driscoll, 99
Mass. 281. In Pettigrew v, Pettigrew,·207 Pa. 313, however, the court holds
distinctly that the widow of the deceased has a property right in the corpse,
and the same view is taken in .Mines v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., 3 Aiberta
L. Rep. 408. In Larso1i v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, an action for mutilation of
the corpse, the court indicates clearly that it considers the corpse as the
property of the next of kin. The principal case seems to uphold that proposition.
EASEMENTS-ORAL AGREEMEN'l' TO RF.S'l'RICl'-ENFORctMEN'.L'.-The vendor
of lots made an oral promise to the vendee that certain building restrictions
in the latter's deed would be imposed upon the other lots in the area. In a
suit to enjoin the conveyance of the other lots free from restrictions. held,
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this was an agreement for the sale of an interest in lands, and void because
not in writing _as required by the Statute of Frauds. Ham v. Massiot Real
Estate Co. (R. I., 1919.), 107 Atl. 1205.
Conceding that such a restriction creates an interest in land, and there
being no part performance to take the promise out of the statute, it would
seem difficult to escape the court's conclusion. In Sprague v. Kimball, 213
Mass. 38o, the court, calling such a restriction an equitable easement, refused
to grant relief.' Jn Pyper v. Whitman, 32 R. I. 35, the grantor represented
that all the lots in an area would be laid out according to an unrecorded plat,
which showed the location of a certain street. In a suit to enjoin the grantor
from changing the location of such street, the court held that no easement
had been acquired. See also Norton v. Ritter, 106 N. Y. Supp. 129; Sq1,ire
v. Campbell, I Myl. & Cr. 459; Gilbert v. Peteler, 38 Barb. 488. On the other
hand, it has been held that a general building scheme maintained from its
inception and relied upon by all parties in interest would create a binding
restriction on all the lots, whether in the hands of the grantor or grantees,
and whether all the deeds contained the restrictions or not. Allen v. ·City
of Detroit, 167 Mich. 464; Re Birmingham & Dist. Land Co. [18931, 1 Ch.
D. 681. Relief has also been granted on the grounds of t>stoppel arising out
of reliance upon the grantor's promise. Bunson v. Bi1ltman, 38 N. Y. Supp.
209. In Talmadge v. The East River Bank 26 N. Y. 105, the court contented
itself by saying that the equity arising from such· representations attached
to the remaining lots. See also Hiibbell v. Warren, 8 Allen 173; Parker v.
Nightengale, 6 Allen 341. In most of these cases no legal remedy was available, as there was neither privity of contract nor privity of estate between
the parties. This may account for the liberality with which some courts qf
equity have regarded such oral restrictions. While the cases are not entirely
in harmony, it may be gathered from the decisions that in the absence of
fraud or part performance relief will not be granted unless there is expressly
or by necessary implication an intention on the part of the grantor that the
restriction shall permanently bind the land retained. Such an intention is
manifested in cases where lots are sold with reference to a general building
plan. See note in 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) g62.
FoRtlGN Exr:cUTORs-Su1Ts BY AND AGAINST FoRI::IGN Exi;curo&s.-Under
certain conditions a statute authorized foreign executors and administrators
to sue and be sued. D, a foreign executor, was sued in his representative
capacity while within the jurisdiction. D moved to set aside the service.
Held, the court had no jurisdiction and the statute must be construed as
giving privilege of suing in all cases, but as taking away immunity from
suit only in those cases where there are local assets, as any other construction would render that part of the statute unconstitutional. Helme v. Buckelew (N. Y., ·1920), 128 N. E. 216.
In the absence of statute the general rule is that a foreign e.'Cecutor
cannot sue or be sued in his representative capacity unless there is a res to
give the· court jurisdiction. lt!jfcrson v. Ball, II] Ala. 436; Greer v. Ferg"-
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son, 56 Ark. 324 Moreover, it cannot be doubted that the state may by
statute extend the privilege of suing to foreign executors, but whether it
can destroy the immunity from suit where there are no local assets, and
without the consent of the state granting the letters, is easily distinguishable
upon principle. In one case, however, this distinction was ignored• and a
suit against a foreign executor was sustained. Cady v. Bard, 21 Kan. 667;
.but the court cites no authorities to sustain its decision. In Thorburn v.
Gates, 225 Fed. 613, the Federal Court was called upon to construe the same
statute involved in th_e principal case, and to avoid holding a part of the
statute unconstitutional limited the operation of that part of the statute
abridging the immunity of foreign e.xecutors from suit to those cases where
the law of the state appointing the executor authorized a foreign action.
In a note to that case in 29 HARV. L. Rr:v. 442, the opinion was asserted that
this was a strained construction and that a more reasonable interpretation
would limit the operation of the statute to cases where there were local
assets. This view is adopted in the principal case. For an exhaustive compilation of authorities on the general subject, see Z1 I,. R. A. 101.
HEPBURN ACT-COMMODITIES CLAUSE-HOLDING CoMPANY.-A holding
company acquired all the stock of a coal mining company and all the stoclc
of the railroad company whose road e.'<:f:ended from the mine fields of the
coal company to the market. The organization and operation of the holding
and each subsidiary company was kept entirely separate, but all three had the
same officers and directors. In an action by the government for. dissolution
under the act of June 29, 1go6, making it unlawful for any railroad company
to transport in interstate commerce any commodity prodµced or mined by
it, or under its authority or in. which it may have an interest direct or indirect, except such commodities as are used by it; held, the coal is mined and
transported under the same authority in violation of the act. Untted States
v. Reading Co. (1920), 40 Sup. Ct. 425.
The decision represents another victory for reality, .in applying the act,
over the fiction of corporate entity; and puts into discard one more scheme
to consolidate the ultimate control over production and transportation of a
commodity and yet not violate the act. In United States v. Delaware &
H1'dso1i Co., 213 U. S. 366, it was held that the interest, direct or indirect,
in the commodity was limited to the legal or equitable meaning, and did not
include articles or commodities produced by a bona fide corporation in which
the railroad company is a stockholder. But in United States ""· Lehigh Valle:;i Railroad Co., 220 U. S. 257, the court held that where the railroad company owned all the stock of the mining company and reduced it to a mere
department, the mining company would not be considered bona fide, and the
act was therefore not avoid_ed by the theory of separate entity. Later a
railroad company owning mines attempted to circumvent the act by organizing a sales company, the stock of which was issued to the railroad shareholders- in lieu of dividends. The sales company contracted for the output
of the mines and became the legal owner of the coal transported over the
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railroad. But because by the contract the railroad compa~y limited the freedom of the sales company in buying coal and in other matters, it was held
the contract was not bona fide and was merely a means by which the railroad
though parting with the legal title retained an interest and control in what
had been sold. United States v. Delaware, Lackawana & Western Railroad
Co., 238 U. S. 516. See also 14 M·1cH. L. IU:v. 49. In a tater case, Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic Association, 247 U. S.
490, in which also the separate entity of a corporation used as a mere agency
of carriers was held to be of no ,avail, the court declared that statements
made in former decisions to the effect that ownership alone of capital stock
in one corporation by another does not create an identity of· interest, cannot
be relied upon where the ownership is resorted to not for the purpose of
participating in the affairs of a corporation in the normal and usual manner,
but to create a mere agency or instrumentality of the owning company. It
thus appears that the court has adopted by this line of decisions bona fide
intentions as the touchstone to distinguish the existence or not of separate
corporate entities. ·And if the railroads do not succeed in devising means
to sell and also keep their great mining interests so as to satisfy the commodities clause of the Interstate Commerce Act, it may be they can do so
only by a bona fide sale of all mining interests. and limit themselves to carrying. The property involved is very large and the problem is Jlot simple.
INDIANS-INDIAN Au.oTn:r: AcQUIRSS FULL EQUITABLE Es'l'A'l'E.-An Act
.of Congress provided that allotments and trust patents be granted ·to Indians
with a further provision that the whole legal estate would be granted at the
end of twenty-five years to the allottee or his heirs, and that all such conveyances shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior,
and when so approved shall convey a full title to the grantee. Ns grantor,
who was not the heir of the allottee received a patent approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Held (Gates, J., dissenting), A took no title as against
the lawful heirs of the allottee. Highrock v. Gavin (S. D., 1920), 179 N.

w.

12.

This decision overrules the recent case of Dougherty v. McFarland, 40
S. D. 1 (1918), decided by the same court, and where it was held that an
allotment was only a trust not binding on Congress, and that a conveyance
approved by the Secretary of the Interior operated to convey the whole estate
in fee simple. In the principal case the majority of the court had changed
their view as to the legal effect of an allotment under the Act of Congress,_
and decided that the allotment conveyed the whole equitable title to the
allottee, of which he could not be divested without his consent. The character of the estate of the allottee under different treaties and Acts of Congress has been variously stated by the courts. In Hallowell v. Commons,
210 Fed. 793, it was said that the full equitable title passed to the Indian
under a similar provision. In United States v. Chase, 245 U. S. 89, the relation between the government and allottee was in issue, and the Supreme
Court decided that an allotment did no more "than to individualize the exist-
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ing tribal right of occupancy." In Fuwlcr v. Scott, 64 Wis. 509, the faets
and the decision were identical with those of the principal case. However,
the question involved seems to be no more than the constntction and mean·
ing of Acts of Congress, and other decisions based upon other treaties or
Acts of Congress should hardly be controlling.
INJUNCTION-SALr:SMAN WORKING FOR COMMISSIONS CANNO'l' ENJOIN
STRix~ or- WORKMEN oF THE CoMPANY EMPLOYING HiM.-In a suit to enjoin

the striking employees of a buggy company, the plaintiff, a salesman whose
sole claim of interest was that of possible interference with his commission
due to the closing down of the corporation's business, was held not to have
sufficient interest to sue without joining the buggy company, and his bill was
dismissed. Davis et al. v. Henry (Circuit Court of Appeals, 1920), 2")() Fed.
261.
The chief cases which seem to support the contention that a party with
a special interest may maintain an equity suit to enjoin a strike without join·
ing the corporation or company affected practically all involve some recog·
nized property interest. In Fordney v. Carter, 203 Fed. 454. bond-holders
are allowed to maintain such a suit, while in Es Parle Haggart~·, 124 Fed.
441, and Jennings v. United States, 264 Fed. 399, the trustees of mortgage
bonds maintained suits alone to enjoin strikers injuring the corporation, on
the basis of injuries to their own interests. A similar case is that of the
stockholder of a corporation who may maintain a suit to protect his own
interests in a corporation only when the corporation for some reason is not
able or willing to maintain suit itself. In such a case equity will go behind
the corporate fiction and recognize that th~ stockholders ~.re the real parties
in interest and will protect their rights. See MARSHALL'S PRlvA'l'£ CoRPORA·
'l'IONS, Secs. 299, 30s. Hence, in the event that the stockholder exhausts all
possibilities in trying to get the corporation. or the majority of the stock·
holders to sue, his equitable interest in the corporate property will be given
protection. But the principal case is not a suit based upon an equitable or
legal interest in the company's property, but is a mere attempt to protect a
possible interest in the profits of the corporation. If such an interest should
be protected in equity, this would mean that any employee with a possibility
of gain or return from the profits of the corporation might enjoin acts that
endangered that possibility. No court seems ever to have gone to that length.
INNin:£P.£R-LIAnir.ITY FOR PRoP.£R'l'Y NO'l' Los'l' 'l'HROUGH GU:EsT's Nr:GI.I·
G£NC£.-The plaintiff, an experienced traveler. entered the defendant's hotel
and lunched there. The rooms were all occupied. In expectation that a
room would later be vacated so that he could register, he left his grip near
the bellboys' bench in the lobby, without calling anybody's attentioi:i to it,
though there were present attendants to take charge of baggage and though
he knew the location of an easily accessible checkroom in the lobby. Here
he could have checked his grip without cost or inconvenience. He then
departed from the hotel, remaining away for several hours. The grip was
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lost. In an action to recover its value, held, plaintiff's conduct did not constitute contributory negligence in law. Swanner v. Conner Hotel Co. (Mo.,
1920), 224 S. W. I23.
The court in a quotation from Read v. Amidon, 4I Vt. I5 (I868), regarding the care required of a guest for his own goods, says : "~ * * he is bound
to use reasonable care and prudence in respect to their i;afety, so as not to
expose them to unnecessary danger or loss." In the Vermont case above,
the lower court directed judgment for the defendant, and this was reversed
on the ground that the negligence of the guest was a question for the jury.
The court in the principal case says, "The Vermont case is quite similar to
the facts of the instant case,'' but it fails to distinguish between leaving an
article of clothing: on a bench in a room in an apparently small inn in I865,
where the proprietor is personally in charge, no other accommodations being
made for the guest's apparel, and leaving a grip in the lobby of a modern,
busy hotel for ten hours without informing anyone of the fact, though
attendants were present to take charge of baggage and though the grip
was left within twenty feet of an easily accessible free checkroom. The
cases cited by the court are not in point: In Jitlaloncy v. Bacon, 33 Mo. App.
50I, the question did not deal with negligence, the court holding a trunk
"infra hospitium" when delivered: to the place where trunks were ordinarily
received by the hotel and where customary notice of the delivery was given
the hotelkeeper. In Labold v. So. Hotel Co., 54 Mo. App. 56i, the· CQUrt held
it was not negligence for a guest to give his coat to an attendan.t with apparent authority to ~are for the same, instead of putting it in the checkroom.
The opinion of the dissenting judge represents what would seem the opinion
of a "reasonable man." It reads: "If the plaintiff's own evidence does not ·
show him guilty of negligence in exposing his hand-grip to peril without
the slightest excuse for so doing, I do not know what he could have done
that would be negligence.. Plaintiff has no one to blame for his loss except
himself and should not be allowed damages."
INSURANCE-BREACH OF CONDITION-CHATTEL MORTGAGE, Vom FOR USURY,
SuF.FICIENT To Avom FIRE PoLICY.-Where a fire policy declared that it should
be void if the property insured should be incumbered by a chattel mortgage,
and the assured gave such a mortgage, which was, however, void for usury,
it was held, that the ·mortgage nevertheless avoided the policy. Lipedes v.
Liverpool & London & Globe 111surance Co. (N. Y., Ig20), I28 N. E. 160.
The rule that conditions of forfeiture are strictly construed against the
party in whose favor they tend to operate is especially applicable to insurance
contracts. Ins. Co. v. Vanlue, I26 Ind. 410; Downey v. Ins. Co., 77 W. Va.
386; Gilchrist v. Ins. Co., I70 Fed. 279; Baley v. Ins. Co., 8o N. Y. 2I; I
Coor.E¥'s BRIEFS oF THE LAW oF INSURANCE, 633. Such being the attitude
of the law, the decision of the principal case is in effect a departure from
the beaten track of the decisions,a departure which the majority opinion
justifies on the ground that "the moral hazard is the test by which the terms
of the policy are to be construed." But an ineffectual incumbrance does not
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increase the moral risk. Rowland v. Ins. Co., 82 Kan. 220. The minority
view, which undoubtedly represents the weight of authority, maintains the
position that the incumbrance must be a valid subsisting lien upon the property in order to be such an inrnmbrance as was within the contemplation of
the parties, and as will effect a forfeiture. Ins. Co. v. Sewing Machine Co.,
41 Mich. 131; Rowland v. Ins. Co., supra; Hanscom v. Ins. Co., 90 Me. 333;
N eafie v. Woodcock, 44 N. Y. Supp. 768.
For a note on the effect of a valid chattel mortgage upon part of the
goods insured, see 8 M1cH. L. Rsv. 67.
INSURANci;:-No L1ABILI'l'Y uNn1'& Pol.ICY Ex.EMP'l'ING DF.A'l'H Rr:sUI.'l'ING
FROM "WAR" FOR DROWNING OF INSURED WHEN LuSI'l'ANIA SANK.-Under a
life insurance policy expressly providing that it did not cover death resulting
directly or ind'irectly or wholly or partly from war, where the insured was
a passenger 011 the British steamer Lusitania, which was sunk by torpedoes
fired from a submarine of the Imperial German government, and which was
part of its naval force, while a state of war existed and was then being
waged between that government and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland, it was held that the insurer was not liable for the drowning of
the insured. Vanderbilt et al. v. Travelers' Insurance Co. (N. Y., 1920), 184
N. Y. Supp. 54
It was the plaintiff's contention that since the transaction violated the
common usages and acceptances of principles of enlightened nations, termed
the laws. o.f war, the death of the insured could not be ascribed to the
excepted condition of the policy. The defendant contended that however
execrable the act of the defendant may have been it wa!i_ none the less the
result of war. These opposing contentions made it necessary for the court
to define the word "war" as used in the policy. The court defined it as
"every contention by force between two nations under the authority of their
respective governments," and therefore concluded that the defendant was
not liable und·er the policy. In the case of Bas v. Tingy, 4 U. S. 37, the same
definition was given. In the narrower sense, war has been regarded as controlled within absolute law. GRO'l'IUS (D.E JURE B£I.LI AC PACIS PRor.sc. 28,
and passim) held this view. Phillimore (Volume 3, p. 82) also said: "It is
regulated by a code as precise and as well understoo'd as that which governs
the intercourse of states in their pacific relations to each other." But these
views of modern jurists owe their existence to mutual concessions and are
mere voluntary relinquishnients of the rights of war. The Rapid, 8 Cranch.
155. In Bas v. Tingy, stipra, it was said that "Every contention by force
between two nations in external matters, under authority of their respective
governments, is not only war but public war. One whole nation is at war
with another whole nation, and all the members of the nation declaring war
are authorized to commit hostilities against all the members of the other in
every place and:· under every circumstance." In Bishop v. Jones and Petty,
28 Tex. 294. it was held that "the general rule depends upon and grows out
of the fundamental principle that when the sovereign power of a state declares
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war against another state, it implies that the whole nation declares war and
that all the subjects or citi7.ens of one are the enemies of those of the other."
See also U. S. v. Active, 24 Fed. Cas. 755. Usage and custom prescribing
restraints imposed for the protection of non-combatants and third persons
generally is merely "a guide which the sovereign follows or abandons at his
will. The rule * * * is addressed to the judgment of the sovereign, and
although it cannot be disregarded by him without obloquy, yet it may be disregarded." Opinion by Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. U. S., 8 Cranch.
.no. It appears then from these authorities that, as far as the courts ar.t
concerned, every authorized act of hostility against the enemy is lawful.
War is governed by no restraints or limitations which any nation is bound
to respect in its dealings with the other. This view, in accordance with that
of the principal case, is maintained by the weight of authority.
Ntw TRIALs-WHtRr: Juncr: MlsnID.crs H1Msr:LF ON A POINT oF LAW.Two defendants were sued for a trespass, and the judge of the county
court, sitting without a jury, apportioned the damages between them and
rendered a several judgment against each for the assigned' p~rtion. Being
convinced tha: this was error in law, the judge granted a new trial. Held
that while he could grant a new trial for error committed in point of fact,
he had no authority to do so for error in point of law. Aster v. Barrett &
Hulme [1920), 3 K. B. ·13.
The effect of the above decision is to make it impossible for the trial
court to correct such an error, and to force the aggrieved party to an appeal.
TQe American practice is generally contra. Hawxhurst v. Rathgeb (18g8);
n9 Cal. 532; Wilson v. City National Bank (1877), 51 Neb. 87. But it is·
'said that when the. error fa purely one of law the effect of the award of a
mew trial is not a re-trial of the case but only a correction of the error by
the court. Lumbermen!s Ins. Co. v. City of St. Paul (1901), 82 Minn. 497;
Me"ill v. Miller (1903), 28 Mont. 134- In Indiana the practire is in accordance with the rule stated in the principal case. Holmes·v. Phoenix Mut. Life
Ins. Co. (1874), 49 Ind. 356; Maynard v. Waidlirh (1901), 156 Ind. 562.

PAttNTs-Urn.1TY oF !NvtNTION.-Plaintiff sued to recover damages for
infringement of a patent. It was shown on the trial that the apparatus as
described in the patent would not work successfully, although it could be
made to do so by some mechanical changes. Held, the patent was invalid
because of the inutility of the device. Beidler v. United States (1920), 40
Sup. Ct. 564It was quite unnecessary for the court to pass on the validity of the
patent. If the defendant was using essentially the same device as that covered by the patent, then obviously the patented device was usable. "The
patent was itself evidence of the utility of Claim 4, and the defendant was.
estopped from denying that it was of value." Westinghouse Co. v. Wagner
Mfg. Co., 225 U. S. 004, 616. If the defendant was using an essentially different device, equally obviously he was not infringing the plaintiff's patent
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and the validity of the patent was quite extraneous to the case. In going
out of its way to invalidate the patent the court disregards several prior
decisions. In Lowell v. Lewis, I Mason 182, the contention was raised that
the patent was invalid for lack of utility in the device. Mr. Justice Story
held, however, "The word 'useful,' therefore, is incorporated into the act in
contradistinction to mischievous or immoral. * * * But if the invention steers
wide of these objections, whether it be more or less useful is a circumstance
very material to the interest of the patentee, but of no importance to the
public." Acc., Bedford v. Hunt, I Mason 302; Kneass v. Schuylkill Bank, 4
Wash. 9. In Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Aluminium Stopper Co., 1o8 Fed.
845, the patentee was allowed to recover damages for infringement even
though .the device as literally described in his patent would not work at all.
The decision was placed on the ground that it took mere mechanical skill
so to change it that it would work, and that the d'efendant, therefore, was
using a device which embodied the idea covered by the plaintiff's patent.
Acc•. Br1m.t'lttick-Balke-Collander v. Backus, etc., Co., 153 Fed. 288. The
principal case cites no authority on the point at all.
TFL'ECRAPRs-Cou.MJ;Rcr..-A contract, made in the state of Alabama for
the transmission of a message from one point in the state to another point
therein, routed by the telegraph company to the point of del~very by way of
a relay station in the state of Georgia, held, an interstate transaction. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Glover (Ala., 1920), 86 So. 154The Alabama court in its "opinion admits that the trend of authority is
contrary to its view. fo fact, its holding on this point of interstate commerce, it agrees, is not necessary to its decision. Of the numerous cases on
the subject, it finds but two to cite as favoring its view, and even in one of
these the statement on the point is plainly obiter. Telegraph Co. v. Taylor,
57 Ind. App. 93, 104 N. E. 771. At first, misconceiving the doctrine of
Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Penna., 145 U. S. 192 (involving the taxation of
intrastate railways passing for a short distance into another state), some
courts held that if the termini of a telegraph line were in one state a message between them was intrastate, even though the line passed in part over
ithe territory of another state. Railroad Commissioners v. Telegraph Co.,
113 N. C. 213; Telegraph Cq. v. Reynolds, 100 Va. 459. Then came the
decision in Hanley v. Kansas City So. R. Co., 187 U. S. 617, which restricted
the doctrine of the Lehigh Valley case, and, in 1910, the amendment by Congress of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 so as to place interstate telegrams under the control of Congress on the same footing with the business
of other common carriers. Most states then turned to the interstate commerce view. Telegraph Co. v. Bolling, 120 Va. 413; Telegraph Co. v. Lee,
174 Ky. 210, Ann. Cas. 1918-C, 1026 and 1036, notes; Klippel v. Telegraph Co.
(Kan., 1920), 186 Pac. 993; L. R. A. 1918-A, 8o7. The United States Supreme
Court in a most recent case held contrary to the decision in the principal
case, even though it was found that the message there was sent out of one
state into another for the purpose of evading liability under the law of the
'

.
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former. Telegraph Co. v. Speight (1920), - Sup. Ct. Rep.-. In Watson""'·
Telegraph Co. (N C., 1019), IOI S. E. 81, the court held that a message like
that in the instant case was not interstate, where the mode of transmission
was not the usual and customary one, but was adopted to evade state law!..
As a curb on fraud this view may be desirable. As a practical matter we
must consider facts, not motives. Telegraph Co. v. ~Mahone, 120 Va. 422.
The fact must be tested by the actual transaction, and the transmission of a
message through two states is actually interstate commerce. Kirkmeyer v.
,State of Kansas, 236 U. S. 568, 59 L. Ed. 721. From the beginning state
courts, jealous of the power of their own commonwealths, have naturally
leaned towards the intrastate view. While the United States Supreme Court,
as naturally, is inclined to enlarge the scope of federal authority. The gen·
eral tendency of the last ten years has been to enlarge federal control in
these fields. See in this connection 16 MICH. L. Riw. 379.
/

TRIAI.-Cor:acroN OF JuRY RJ>vr:as1nr.:r; ERRoR.-ln a prosecution for violation of the Prohibition Act, the jury reported that they were unable to agree.
The court instructed the jurymen. that, should they be unable to arrive at a
verdict, it would be necessary for the court to discharge them for the remainder of the term. On appeal of the defendant from the conviction, it was
held, that such an instruction made for the purpose of coercing a jury is
reversible error. People v. Strzempkowski (Mich., 1920), 178 N. W. 771.
The court may properly urge upon the jury the necessity of their coming
to a verdict. Pierce v. Reh fuss, 35 Mich. 53; White v. Calder, 35 N. Y. 183.
As a reason for this necessity, the court may advance the expense to the state
of a retrial, Kelly et al. v. Doremus et al.; 75 Mich. 147 (but see Railway Co.
v. Ba.. ber (Tex.), 209 S. 'N. 394, 17 MICH. L. Rz:v. 6o7); or the expense to
the parties, Pierce v. Rehfuss, supra; or the length of time expended on the
case at the present trial, ShelJ• v. Shely, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1021; Knickerbocker
Ice Co. v. Peim. R. Co., 253 Pa. 54- But it is not proper to coerce the jury
to arrive at a verdict, either by threatening to keep them without food, Hancock v. Elam, 62 Tenn. 33; or suggesting the incompetence of the minority
of the jury, Twiss v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co., 6I N. Y. App. Div. 286; or by
threat to discharge. Penpl,• v. Slrzempkowski, supra. The li~e of demarcation seems to be between. using reasonable means to urge the jury to arrive
at a verdict, White v. Fulton, 68 Ga. Sil, and threats for the purpose of
coercing them, Hancock v. Elam, supra. However, it is possible that the
court, in the principal case, misconceived the anxiety which a jury might have
on being threatened with discharge for the remainder of the term.
TRov:r;R AND CoNV:r:RSION-M:EASUR:r: OF DAMAGES FOR CoNvttSION 01'

Tn.rn:r:R.-Trees were unlawfully, but not willfully, cut, and the cut timber
converted. Held, the measure of recovery in trover is the value of the timber at the time and! place of conversion, with interest, with no deductions
for labor perfo1med upon the timber anterior to the consummation of the conversion by actual removal. West YcllMu Pine Co. v. Stephens (Fla., 1920),
86 So. 241.
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The court here announces the measure of damages in cases of the conversion of re:ilty as first pronounced in Martin v. Porter, 5 M. & W. 352,
and followed in Morgan v. Powell, 3 Q. B. 278. This rule, though favored
in cases where the taking was willful or fraudulent, was held inapplicable
where the defendant acted inadvertently and in the honest belief that he
had a right to do what he did. Where the taker acted in good faith, it was
held more reasonable that the "estimate should be the fair value of the property in situ, before severance." lVood v. Morewood, j Q. B. 440, note. This
distinction between willful and innocent taking was followed in Jegon v.
Vivia11, L. R 3, Ch. 742, and iii Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., 5 App.
Cas. 39. In America, Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Pa. 291, established the doctrine·
that where the defendant acted in good faith he should be allowed the value
l)f his labor and the measure of damages should be the value of the property
bcfor!! the wrongdoing he[!an. 'fhe trend of authority shows that American
courts have taken note of the injustice and oppression of the rule of Martin
v. Port~r, supra, and of the principal case, where the taking is not willful,
but innocent. The strict rule may cause_trespassers to be more careful, yet
it gives the injured party more than j~st compensation for the injury he has
suffered, and fails to distinguish between fraud and mere mistake. S2ncw1cK, DAMAG2S [9 Ed.], Sec. 503.
TRusTS-CoNsTRucnvr: TRusTs-CoNVF.YANCE WITH ORAL AG~M2NT TG
R£0oNV2Y.-S and his mother, the defendant, .owned undivided parts of au

estate. S conveyed his interest to D to enable her to raise money by mortgage, on an cral agreement to reconvey when the mortgage should be paid.
D sold the property after the death of S, repudiating the oral agreement,
and P, the wife and heir of S, brings action to enforce a trust by implication,
arising from the fiduciary relation and the .repudiation. Held, that a trust
by implication, excepted from the Statute of Frauds, arises. Silvers v.
Howard et al. (Kan., 1920), 190 Pac. 1.
The court says that it is going too far to say that, in the absem:e of
fraud, a trust can be raised wherever it is against equity to retain property,
but finds "constructive fraud" in the abuse of the fiduciary relation. By the
weight of authority in America, the parol evidence rule and the statute of
fraud's form insurmountable objections to enforcing a constructive trust in
the above situation, or where grantee agrees to hold in trust, Titcomb v.
Morrill, 10 Allen 15, unless there is dishonest intention at the time of conveyance, Patton v. Beecher, 62 Ala. 579; Revel v. Alb2rt, 162 N. W. 595; or
a special fiduciary relation, Biggins v. Biggins, 133 Ill. 2u; see Bullenkamp
v. Bullenkamp, 43 N. Y. App. 510. But there should be no difference between
dishonest intention at the time of conveyance and after conveyance; see
Gibben v. Taylor, 139 Ind. 573. The constructive trust arises not because of
the parol agreement but because of the grantee being unjustly enriched
thereby. The English cases recognize this. Hutchins v. Lee, I Atk. 447;
Davies v. Otty, 35 Beav. 2o8; Haigh v. Kaye, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 469; Booth. v.
Turle, L. R. 16 Equity Cas. 182; Peacock v. Nelson, 50 Mo. 256 (semble).
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California finds 110 difference between dishonest intention at the time of conveyance and later. Hillyer v. HJ•nes, 33 Cal. App. 5oCi; Hatcher v. Hat.·her,
264 Pa. St. 10:, ar.cord. And in a case of confidential relationship, Bradley
v. Bradl.:s, 165 Cal. 237, the court talks about the grantee taking an unconscionable advantage over the confiding trustor, although in the same case,
which came up later, 37 Cat. App. 263, the court simply said that the breach
of the promise is "constructive fraud" where there is a confidential relation,
thus declaring .in accord with the principal case. Yet, finding "constructive
fraud" where there is a breach of promise by one in a confidential relation
is a departure from the logic of the situation. A constructive trust is a
remedial device to do justice, and has nothing to do with the statute of
frauds. See Davies v. Otty, supra. One wonders if the American courts
will not eventually put it squarely on· this ground. See article by G. P.
Costigan, Jr., 12 Mien. L. ~. 515.
TRusTS-!NV£STKSNTS-C0RPORAtt STOcKs.-A trustee invested trust
funds in preferred stock of a private corporation which failed. In an action
by the beneficiaries against the trustee for losses, held, that he is not liable.
In re Buhl's Estate (Mich., 1920), 178 N. W. 651.
This case decides this point for the first time in Michigan. It follows
the Massachusetts rule, substantially, allowing a trustee to invest in the stock
of a private corporation if the corporation is one in which a prudent man of
intelligence in such matters would invest when seeking a permanent investment, the primary object of which is the preservation of the fund, the obtaining of income being of secondary importance. This rule was laid down in
dicta in Harvard CC'llege v. Amory, 7 Pick. 446, and is followed in Massachusetts and some other states. Lovell v. Minot, 20 Pick. u6 (notes secured
by stocks in manufacturing company); Kimball v. Whitney, 233 Mass. 321,
in which the court upheld investment in certificates of an unincorporated
holding company; Washington v. Emery, 57 N. C. 32 (administrator.); see
Dickinson, Appellant, 152 Mass. 184- The opposing rule in the United States
is the so-called New York rule, which holds that the fiduciary relation necessarily excludes placing funds beyond control of trustee, where they can be
exposed to the hazard of loss or gain, according to the success of the enterprise, in the absence of authority given in the trust instrument; or by statute
or order of the court c'lntrolling the trust. King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76:
Worrell's Appeal, 23 Pa. 44 (guardian); Commonwealtli v. McConnell, 226
Pa. St. 244 (lunatic committee) ; Tucker v. State, 72 Ind. 242 (guardian) ;
see White v. Sherman, 168 Ill. 589. This is the majority rule. Authority of
the settlor, however, given in the trust instrument, protects the trustee.
Willis :v. Braucher, 79 Ohi<;> St. 290. It seems as though the New York
courts recognize a harshness in the rule. In }.fatter of Hall, 164 N. Y. 1¢,
where authority was given to invest in real or personal securities as trustees
should see fit, the court intimates that if they had invested in stocks other
than those of new and untried companies, they would not have been liable.
And in In re McDowell,_ 16g N. Y. S. 853, where trustees by the instrument
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were given discretion, the court intimates that if they had invested: in searnned securities they would not have been liable. And see In re Tozuer's
Estate, '?53 P-i. St. 3Qf.. The principal case goes only so far as to allow
investment in preferred stock, but it would be expected that the court would
go as far as the Massachusetts court. It would seem that Michigan has followed the wiser rule, to apply in the situation where the trustee is without
specific authority, in this day where funds are many and gilt-edged investments are few, and where many corporations are as safe a permanent invest:.
ment as are the orthodox permissible trust investments. See McKINN£Y,
LIABILITlF.S oF TRuSTJ.;F.S l'OR h:v£STM£NTS; 16 Ann. Cas. 69.
'fRUSTs-TuusT FUNDS M1NGL1':D WITll FuNDs OF TRusn;r:-P~SUltPTION

IN CASS OF W1T11DRAW.ALS AND SUBSl!QU£NT D£POS1Ts.-A trustee wrongfully
mingled trust funds witJl money of his own in his personal bank account.
Withdrawals reduced the balance to less than the amount of the original trust
fund. Subsequent deposits by the trustee from his own money left a balance
greater than the amount of the trust fund. In an action to recover the mQney
thus wrongfully mingled, held, that even though there was no actual intent
to make restoration, the trustee's motive in making these deposits is immaterial and he must be presumed to have restored the trust fund. Hungerford
v. Curtis (R. I., 1920), uo Atl. 650.
\Vhere the trustee has wrongfully mingled his money with trust funds,
:my withdrawals by him will be presumed to have been made from his own
money. Thus, so long as a balance remains equal to the amount of the trust
fund, the claimant can have full satisfaction. · Knatchbull v. Hallett, 13 Ch.
D. 696; Board of Fire {Ind Water Commissioners v. Wilkenson, u9 Mich.
655; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Elliotte, 218 Fed. 56i. If, after making withdrawals resulting in a balance less than the original trust moneys, the wrongdoer makes deposits from other sources, such sums cannot be attributed to
the trust account. Powell v. Mo. & Ark. Land Co., 99 Ark. 553; Covey v.
Cannon, 104 Ark. 550; Board of Commissioners v. Strawn, 157 Fed. 49;
Hewitt v. Hayes, 205 Mass. 356; American Can Co. v. Williams, 178 Fed. 42(1.
Cases holding that such additions must be regarded as a restoration of the
trust funds will be found to rest, it is believed, on an actual intent of the
wrongdoer to make restitution, or upon circumstances from which such an
intent could reasonably be inferred. le/fray v. Towar, 63 N. J. Eq. 530;
State Savings Bank v. Thompson, 128. Pac.. n20; United National RaJ1k v.
Weatherby, 70 App. Div. (N. Y.) 279; Its re Northrup, 152 Fed~ 263. At least
in the face of an intent to the contrary, no court seems to have indulged in
the presumption that the wrongdoer meant to make restoration. It is submitted that the holding of the court in the instant case to the effect that the
actual intent is immaterial is at least misleading. The presump.tion that the
wrongdoer meant to make reparation may not be a violent one, in view of
his obvious duty to do so, but at the most it is no more than a presumption
and cannot stand in the face of evidence. Such is the rule with reference
to the presumption that the wrongdoer withdraws his own money first.
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Covey v. Cannon, supra. For an exhaustive treatment of this whole subject,
see article by Professor Scott on the "Right to Follow Money Wrongfully
Mingled with Other Money,'' in 2'J HARV. L. R.Ev. 125. See also Scott's CAsits
ON TRUSTS, pp. 547-548. note.
WoRKH~N's ColllP£NSAT10N AC'l'--lNJURY .l\R1s1NG Ou'l' oF AND IN CouRsi;
OF EMPLOYHENT.-An employee loading wagons of straw at a stack sought
rest in the sh~de of a box car during his leisure period, and fell asleep
and was fatally injured by the moving of the car. Held, the injury did not
arise out of or in the course of the employment, within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. T.Veis Paper Mill Co. v. Ind1istrial Commission et al. (Ill., 1920), 12'/ N. E. 732.
The statutes of most of the states require that in order to recover under
the Workmen's Compensation Act for an injury received, the injury must
arise out of and in the course of employment. The difficulty is in the application of this rule. The court in the principal case held that in order to
recover under the act the accident must have resulted from a risk reasonably incidental to the employment; and a risk is incidental to the employment
when it belongs to or is connected with what the employee has to do in fulfilling his contract of service. In Brown et al. v. Bristol Last Bl£>ck Co.
( 1920), - Vt. -, 1o8 Atl. 927, the court said: "An injury arises in the
course of employment when it arises within the period of the employment,
at a place where the employee may reasonably be, and while he is reason:!bly
fulfilling the duties of his employment; and an injury arises out of the
employment when it occurs in the course of it, and as a proximate r('sult of
it, or when the injury is a natural and necessary incident or consequence of
the employment, a risk being incidental to the employment when it belongs
to or is connected with what a workman has to do in filling his contract."
In Haggard's Case, - Mass.-, 125 N. E. 565, where a city's employee during the noon hour sat to eat his lunch on the railroad track, leaning against
a car, and was injured when the car was kicked, it was held that the injury
was not in the course of his employment by the city to entipe him to compensation under the Compensation Act; the court saying that plaintiff was
not in a place in which it was necessary for him to be in the course of his
work, or in going to or coming from it. The act in which he was engaged
when injured had no relation to his employment. He chose to go to a dangerous place where he had no business to go, incurring a danger of his own
choosing and one altogether outside any reasonable exercise of his employment. In Buvia v. Oscar Daniels Co., 203 Mich. 73, the court said: "An
injury arises out of the employment within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal conpection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting
injury." Where an employee voluntarily puts himself in a place of danger,
where he is not required to go, the employer is in no way responsible for
resulting injury. Therriault v. England et al., 43 Mont. 376, u6 Pac. 581.
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Upon the authority of these cases the decision in the principal case is
undoubtedly correct, and the same conclusion would probably be reached in
all jurisdictions. It is apparent, upon all the circumstances, that there was
no causal connection between the conditions under which the work was
required to be performed and the resulting injury. The agency which produced the injury was in no way connected with the work performed by the
employee. It cannot be said that while the employee was lying down to
rest himself he was doing any service required by his employment, and it is
impossible to see wherein his work e.'Cposec! him to the danger which resulted
in his injury. The spot he chose was dangerous. The evidence showed that
a switch engine came upon the tracks twice daily. It could not have been
contemplated in the contract of employment that when the employe had an
interval in which he could rest that he would lie down in such a place.- The
purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is not to insure the employee
against all injuries, but to protect him against a risk of hazard taken to perform the master's task. Pace v. Appoonoose County, 184 Ia. 498, 168 N. W.
91(.. See 17 M1cH. L. R1'V. 28o: 16 MICH. L. Rsv. 179, 462.

